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Integrating Transnational Legal Perspectives
into the First Year Curriculum
Gerald Torres*
I. Introduction
I want to thank Charlotte Ku for inviting me to participate in this
discussion. A year spent as President of the Association of American
Law Schools has given me some ideas about the wisdom of integrating
elements of international or transnational law into the curriculum
generally and especially into the first year and about how it might be
done.
In the Association of American Law Schools we have taken a
leadership role in creating an international association of law schools.
This effort has arisen out of recognition of the increasing integration of
markets (including markets for services). But the effort was also born of
our recognition of the critical practical importance that the continually
contested idea of the rule of law has for our global community. This
reality is now lived everyday-not just in foreign affairs or international
commerce. Increasingly, we see that the world is not "over there," but
on Main Street as well as on Wall Street. Thus, the average lawyer,
while not needing to be an expert in international or transnational law,
needs to have some familiarity with other legal systems because
wherever she practices, foreign law and foreign legal system are likely to
have relevance for the issues that face her clients. Moreover, a study of
transnational and international law helps law students understand their
own system better because a study in depth reveals underlying values in
each.
II. The First Day of School
While I now have a deep interest in international law and
comparative law (especially environmental law, human rights and the
law relating to indigenous peoples), it did not start that way.
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Accordingly, property, the first year course I routinely taught, had very
little in the way of international content with the exception of the
historical material relating to the Anglo roots of American property law.
Most of the casebooks had very little, if any explicit international legal
content. Of course, the Anglo legal history could scarcely be said to
consist of international content since American property law began as but
a branch on that tree.
Yet as I began teaching I noted most property casebooks started, if
not with wild animals and the law of capture, then with the famous case
of Johnson v. M'Intosh.1 I, too, used to begin with Johnson. It was
typically edited to reveal something about the doctrine of discovery as a
basis for a root claim to property ownership. The doctrine of discovery
is, of course, an artifact of the colonial expansion of European powers
and was one basis for making claims that could be asserted against
colonial rival. It also defined the relationship between the "discoverer"
and any occupants of the territory discovered.
Despite the attempts of casebook editors to make it simple, it is, in
fact, a very difficult case. One, I ultimately decided, was much too
difficult for students on their first day of law school.
In some ways, of course, the question in Johnson v. M'Intosh could
be approached in manner that obscured its difficulty even as it served a
heuristic purpose. Baldly put the question was this: should a claimant
who derived his title from a purchase from an Indian tribe and thus
claimed a legal priority based upon the time of purchase (first-in-time)
prevail in an action in ejectment against another claimant to the same
parcel of land who derived his title from a later federal patent? Or,
phrased another way, does the tribe have residual title in federal territory
that can defeat the title claimed by the federal government? So what
makes this a difficult case?
What makes it difficult is not making sense of the outcome or
following the reasoning as it is typically presented. What makes it
difficult is what is usually left out of the typical property casebook.
First, there is the question of the audience for the opinion. To whom was
Justice Marshall speaking? Was he merely speaking to the parties
litigant? If so, his opinion might have directly addressed the
international law claims of each side. In this response he would have had
to explain why the aboriginal sovereignty of the tribes was insufficient to
give them a proprietary interest capable of defeating a later claim. He
would have had to have made a legal argument. Second, assuming the
1. 21 U.S. 543 (1823). The discussion that follows is substantial drawn from an
earlier essay of mine: Gerald Torres and Erin Ruble Perfect Good Faith, 5 NEV. L.J. 93
(2004).
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students can appreciate the complexity of the answer to the first question:
What are we to make of the unspoken successor state theory of law
applied by Marshall to support the primacy of the federal government
over both the states and the tribes? Or how should we consider the
appeals to international law that Marshall uses to validate the holding
and to fix the relationship of the federal government both to the states
and to foreign sovereigns? (Even if he makes these appeals without
resort to citation.) What, indeed, are we to make of the structural
constitutional arguments embedded if not addressed in the reasoning?
These questions triggered what Marshall called the "magnitude of
interest" the case demanded above the settlement of the simple ejectment
action. What stirred the interest was not the straight forward question of
the superiority of federal power to that of the Indians. By some lights,
that is not even a justiciable question. Justice Marshall uses the dispute
to map the contours of federal power both in relation to the states as well
as to the powers of Europe that still had pretensions in the Americas.
Marshall was laying the groundwork that established the inherent
powers of the federal government as on a par with European nations and
thus could use those arguments to claim both title to the land and
sovereignty over the inhabitants. It was the settled law among nations
that provided for the accommodations in the Americas that established
the power in the hands of the federal government. For Marshall, the
question became one of consistency with existing law.
[A]ll the nations of Europe, who have acquired territory on this
continent, have asserted in themselves, and have recognized in others,
the exclusive right of the discoverer to appropriate the lands occupied
by the Indians. Have the American States rejected or adopted this
principle?
2
The law announced by Britain that underlay the Proclamation of
1763 represented both the positive law and the theoretical structure for
the sovereignty of the states out of which the union was formed. What
the states ceded to the federal government, according to Marshall's
analysis was not just the territory beyond boundaries agreed upon as the
territorial reach of the states, but with it all of the sovereign power over
those territories that came to the states from the crown. This power gave
to the federal government all of the powers regarding Indians that the
crown held, but the monopoly on this power fixed the relationship
between the United States and the European powers as one of juridical
equality. All of these conclusions would hold whether the land and the
entire legislative jurisdiction of sovereignty that the territorial claims
2. Johnson, 21 U.S. at 584.
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implied had come into the hands of the British and from it to the states
and from them to the federal government via discovery or conquest.
What should not be lost in this discussion, however, is that all of the
"law" that Marshall applied was derived, ultimately from the
international law. In Johnson, Marshall adverted to the law of nations
that limited the prerogatives of the conqueror and gave to the federal
government the power to control the actions of those who would
interfere with the national government's exercise of that basic power.
Once these conditions are laid out it quickly becomes clear that in
order to teach this case well and, in fact, to teach it in a way that informs
more about the nature of legal argument than about property law
doctrine, some background understanding of international law is
required. In fact, I think it is almost impossible to fully understand the
nature of the legal argument Marshall is making without reference to the
claims that are rooted in international law. Equally important in that case
is the way in which domestic legal ideas about ownership and relativity
of title only make sense in light of the surrounding principles of
international law. Without that analysis it is easy to slip into a discussion
of the opinions as an expression of law as just politics and to sow some
of the seeds of cynicism that so often infects law students.
The experience of trying to teach Johnson, however, (and I am a
little embarrassed to say this) revealed to me the extent to which a
sensitivity to international legal norms was both instructive and required
to really do the basic job of preparing students for the serious study of
law. I wondered how the other first year instructors did it or if it
occurred to them.
III. Deus Ex Machina
Later, some time after I abandoned the idea of teaching Johnson in
the first year, I had a student who proposed a pedagogical research
project. What she wanted to do was to design international law units for
every first-year class. How could I refuse? The idea behind the project
was that international law is something that all law students should be
exposed to early and systematically. The best way to do this would be to
integrate it into what students are led to believe constitute the basics of a
legal education. What her project did was to reorient my thinking about
how international and transnational law ought to be incorporated into the
curriculum. As my discussion of Johnson makes clear, international law
was and has always been part of the first year curriculum.
Adopting a pervasive approach as proposed by my student in her
research project (and, I am told, by a variety of writers) would not
substitute for a comprehensive course on international or transnational
[Vol. 23:4
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law. The project did crystallize a concern about how to illuminate the
international and transnational content that was already there. This is the
point I tried to highlight in my discussion of Johnson. What that
discussion should also have crystallized is my concern about the need to
historicize the study of international and global legal institutions and
practices.3
I think that building an understanding of the legal/historical
processes entailed in a developing global world order is critical for an
accurate understanding of the contours and state of international law.4 In
a review of international law casebooks, David J. Bederman made the
following observation:
The ultimate measure of the quality of an international law casebook
should not be its fidelity to some intellectual agenda or theoretical
methodology, but rather, its coherence in presenting the subject to
student readers and in sparking an abiding interest in the study of
international law as a professional practice, as a field of intellectual
inquiry, and as a necessary and vital adjunct of an informed
citizenry.
5
Of course this is true, but it really begs the question asked by
Professor Mathais Reimann in his essay calling for a new transnational
course: what is the measure of coherence? 6  Certainly, it is, at a
minimum, fidelity to a narrative line concerning the evolution of
international law; even if that narrative is at root atheoretical (casebooks
have not yet adopted the disnarrative as a pedagogical device).7  The
quality of coherence, it seems to me is measured by a narrative line that
connects the current state of transnational and international law with the
other law that students are learning. That is the lesson that my student's
research project revealed. It is not a deep insight, assuredly, but it is
central to the evolving integration of systems of law and legal
3. Mathias Reimann develops this point in his call for a new transnational course,
see Mathias Reimann, From The Law of Nations to Transnational Law: Why We Need A
New Basic Course for the International Curriculum, 22 PENN ST. INT'L L. REV. 397
(2004). I also tend to agree with Reimann that what counts as international law has itself
become a contested idea and one not given to razor sharp boundaries. As my co-panelist
makes plain, this is especially true in the practice of transnational/intemational law.
4. In a different context Walter Mignolo makes a similar point in the continuing
relevance of enlightenment ideas in the post-colonial world, see, Mignolo, Local
Histories/Global Designs (2000).
5. David J. Bederman, Review Essay International Law Casebook: Tradition,
Revision, and Pedagogy 98 AM. J. INT'L L. 200 (2004)
6. Reimann, supra note 3.
7. A disnarrative structure would be one that focused on the disjunctive experience
of life or presented itself as a chronicle of the immediate or a representation of an
emergent hybridity.
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institutions. This integration needs to occur at the level of pedagogy
because it is occurring at the level of practice, the level of doctrine, and
ultimately at the level of theory.
IV. Conclusion
Of course, the discussion of one early case from property does not
prove anything about the necessity of familiarizing students with the
contours of international law. Yet, as Professor Janet Levit has pointed
out recently in an essay in Tulsa Journal of Comparative and
International Law, international law turns up every day in venues as
diverse as the United States Supreme Court or the Oklahoma Court of
Criminal Appeals. 8 It is not the province of recondite cases, but as
central as life and death. The Torres case chronicled in Professor Levit's
essay revolved around the role of international norms in state court
adjudication of charges that resulted in a state court death sentence for
the defendant, Torres. Yet, her discussion of how international law
norms would be applied (and which might be applicable) revealed that
"state courts are clearly transnational, not mere parochial, actors; yet
their role in solidifying international norms and furthering compliance
with international law is woefully underappreciated." 9 Perhaps more to
the point she makes plain that the implications for practice are just as
important as they might be for scholars. She notes that:
If state courts are important transnational actors, what does this
suggest about advocacy tactics? Judges, and not merely state judges
for that matter, sometimes misstate even the most fundamental tenets
of international law and simply must receive more training in
international law. So it is crucial that lawyers, who advocate before
such judges, understand their briefs not only as advocacy
opportunities but also as opportunities to instruct courts in the legal
dynamics of international law. Accordingly, all lawyers, not just
those elite international law professors and those affiliated with
certain NGOs, should become familiar with basic international law
concepts (with strong implications, of course, for law school
curricula).0
Her conclusions reinforce the point I have been trying to make.
International law is a part of all the law we learn and has already been in
8. Janet Koven Levit, A Tale of International Law in the Heartland: Torres and the
Role of State Courts in Transnational Legal Conversation, 12 TULSA J. COMP. & INT'L L.
163 (2004). See also Sarah Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens,
Territories, and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power Over Foreign Affairs,
81 TEX. L. REV. 1 (2002).
9. Koven Levit, supra note 8.
10. Id. at 186.
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the material we teach. It is perhaps time to make that presence visible.

